"Second Wave"

Since the early 1980s, changes in association systems have spread across borders USA, first to Great Britain, and then to European countries and Japan. 
The factors for restructuring the system of business associations were:
• transition to the post-industrial stage of development: structural restructuring economy associated with industrial contraction and sector expansion services
• globalization of the economy: freer movement of capital across national borders, big business in a certain respect has not “outgrown” only national economies, but also the nation state
• development of the European Union: the emergence of supranational authorities in Europe and expanding access points to political decision-making
• political decentralization: expanding the powers of regional bodies authorities (in France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan)
• neoliberal state reform: reducing opportunities for government intervention in the economy, increasing the compatibility of the apparatus state and market.

Since the early 1980s, the transition to a post-industrial level of development, globalization economics and neoliberal state reform brought changes to the systems business associations established in leading countries of Europe and Japan. By the beginning of economic and political changes, business associations in the most developed countries of the West have long been established. This endowed them with a significant reserve strength and increased adaptability. National systems of associations businesses in the EU and Japan have adapted to change using three main strategies: consolidation, internal reform and rationalization. As a result the “landscape” of associations changed slightly; internal ones were much more serious change.

The biggest changes affected only two national systems of associations, where mergers of parent business associations took place - in Sweden and Japan. In Sweden, 2001, as a result of the merger of two parent business associations, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises. In Japan, in 2002, there was also a merger of two parent associations, as a result of which the enlarged organization Nippon arose Keidanren. The internal reform strategy has become more widespread: leading business associations were involved in large-scale internal restructuring five countries - France, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Japan (in the last two cases restructuring of the organizational structure was an inevitable result of the merger).

The following general features of the organizational structure reform can be identified:

• limiting the powers of the central organization
• “lightening” the organizational structure: reducing intermediate links, transition to “flat” type organizational structures;
• “managerialization”: bringing the apparatus of association closer to the apparatus of private companies;
• increasing internal differentiation, i.e. ability to capture and respond to requests from a diverse membership base;
• consolidation of the internal structure by strengthening ties with regional and local associations, increasing their status within the association, as well as introduction of “direct membership”;
• strengthening the importance of a system of services focused on member needs.
In two cases, the result of internal reform was the consolidation of limited powers of the central organization through the transformation of a confederal principle as the basis for building a leading business association. In France, at transformation of the NSFP into MEDEF, the confederal principle was enshrined in formal status of the association. In Sweden, for the main business association there was also a confederal structure was elected (the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises). In the charter of the new association, it was specially emphasized that the central organization and its member associations are recognized as completely independent and autonomous in relation to each other.

The merger of two parent unions in Sweden was accompanied by structural reform apparatus of the new association: a significant part of the functions that were previously performed permanent apparatus of the association (information support, management finances and wages) was transferred to a specially created for these purposes service company on the principle of “external contracting”. In France, the transformation National Council of French Entrepreneurs NSFP) in MEDEF in 1998 also was associated with a restructuring of the organizational structure, during which the commissions general profile (economic and social) were replaced by a differentiated network working groups focused on solving specific problems (nine in total). The internal reorganization of MEDEF took place under the sign of organizational consolidation structures: increased attention to the communication system, as well as to collective and individual members – lower level associations and companies. Initially, the communications working group was headed personally by the presidentconfederation, but the working group was subsequently abolished and its functions included within the direct authority of the president of the association. Influence of member associations within MEDEF was supplied directly dependent on the contribution to the general budget confederation. (For example, the share of dues from only one industry association, uniting metallurgical companies, MEDEF’s budget was approximately 30% of the MEDEF budget, while the share of all intersectoral local associations accounted for less than 10% of MEDEF's budget). The introduction of “direct membership” became a tool for strengthening ties with companies. Previously, only associations could become members of MEDEF. Individual firms could join the association only through industry or local membership interindustry associations. Now the conditions for joining the confederation have been changed and individual companies were given the opportunity to directly join the association. The introduction of individual membership made it possible to balance the centrifugal effect, generated by transformation into a confederation. Direct membership expanded influence in confederation of large firms.

The institution of direct membership was not limited only to MEDEF: on a pan-European basis. At the same level, associations also appeared that united individual members. Reform Confindustria 2001 was also accompanied by an expansion of the powers of regional business federations in order to turn them into a full-fledged partner of regional authorities, strengthened as a result of political decentralization. In Austria, increasing the role of regional business associations has become an integral part of several waves of reform of the “chamber system” in the second half of the 1990s – early 2000s. Internal reform in parent business associations was accompanied by tighter bringing the service system closer to the needs of members (MEDEF, Chamber of Business in Austria).

The rationalization strategy turned out to be the most common; it captured a large part of leading business associations. The goal of rationalization was to reduce resources,directly controlled by associations (budget size, permanent staff, amount of membership fees). Headquarters business associations in Sweden and Austria, controlled the largest volumes of financial resources, significantly reduced your budgets. The budget of parent business associations in Germany has decreased and Great Britain. Membership fees were also reduced: in 1992, for the first time in its history, this was done by the Swedish Confederation of Employers, in the second half of the 1990s - In the early 2000s, the Austrian Business Chamber also took this step. Passed everywhere
reduction of permanent staff. In Great Britain, the permanent staff of the presenter national business association, Confederation of British Industry (CBI), noticeably “lost weight” during the reign of M. Thatcher and J. Major. In Sweden, unification two parent associations led to a reduction in personnel of the new organization of more than than one third. In Austria, the Chamber of Business also had to reduce the number of functionaries.
As a result of consolidation, reform and rationalization, increasing dependence of business associations on their members. It expands influence large companies within many national associations. In employers' unions the weakening of central organizations was accompanied by a redistribution of functions in benefiting industry associations or large companies.

Large companies in Sweden within the ShKR in 1991 they initiated the abolition of centralized collectively negotiated wage regulation. In Germany, large companies in the early 1990s years have achieved the right not to participate in tariff agreements concluded industry unions of employers. In the UK, the KBP has strengthened its positions of large companies (“Group of Chairmen of Multinational Corporations” - Multinational Chairmen's Group). At the same time, the strengthening of the influence of the largest firms in national associations was not universal. The situation in Confindustry indicates the presence of an opposite trend. Election in 2000 of a new leader instead of a representative of the Fiat concern and the 2002 reform talked about the ability of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs to change the orientation of the leading national business association in accordance with its own interests. The strengthening of big business is not limited to national associations. Back in the early 1980s, the head pan-European association was created big business with coordination functions: European round table industrialists (European Round Table of Industrialists - ERT). As an integral part mechanism of the EU-US summit, a communication channel between the European business elite and US business elite: “The Transatlantic Business” Dialogue).

As a result of the integration of national and sectoral employers' unions into general business associations there was a erosion of the functional specialization in representing the collective interests of employers. In Great Britain, in the 1980s – 1990s. several industrial employers' unions have been liquidated. Some of them were transformed into associations specializing in performing political functions. Consolidation of the largest parent associations business in Sweden and Japan was accompanied by the liquidation of autonomous a lot of collective employers' representatives (the Swedish Confederation of Employers and Nikkeiren, Japan's umbrella employers' union). In Sweden this was preceded the gradual decline of sectoral employers' unions and the process of mergers with sectoral unions business associations, which has developed since the early 1980s. (The most significant mergers into industry business associations and industry employers' unions have occurred in the late 1980s in the construction industry and in the early 1990s in mechanical engineering.) Another reason for the weakening of employers' unions was decentralization of collective bargaining functions. Role of the central organization employers, where it is retained, is limited to the performance of functions coordination, and the main collective bargaining process is transferred mainly to the level of industry associations of employers, in some cases the corresponding powers are transferred to individual large firms (Germany).

There has been a differentiation of connections between leading business associations and political one in batches. In the UK partner of the leading association of KBP and large companies now it has become not only the Conservative Party, but also the New Labor Party. In Italy, the differentiation of political ties occurred as a result of the collapse of the old party system and the collapse of the dominant Christian Democratic Party (CDP). In Japan, differentiation of Keidanren political connections also occurred in as a result of the collapse of the old party system: now, in addition to the LDP, the leading partner association and its members became the Democratic Party. Along with differentiation, there is also a decentralization of political connections: members leading associations become more autonomous in building relationships with parties, and the role of the central organization is limited to coordination. 

The decentralization of relations with political parties was clearly demonstrated by the example of Keidanren. In 2003, when a leading Japanese business association decided to relaunch participation in political finance, old centralized quota-based scheme was not restored. The new scheme offers Keidanren members their own allocate funds based on the recommendations of the association. Decentralization of relations with political parties - another manifestation of the growing role of members, first of all, large companies. In Europe, this was previously typical only for France, where the functions of political representation of the interests of large companies are not delegated to industry business associations. Differentiation and decentralization connections with political parties objectively brings together business associations in countries, Europe and Japan with their counterparts in the USA.

In relations between national governments and national groups interests appeared a certain distance. In some cases, national governments make decisions ignoring established interest groups, relying for electoral support, and are guided by their own priorities, formed without taking into account the priorities of national interest groups (For example, it could serve as negotiations between the French government on issues agricultural policy with GATT). In response, national interest groups begin to directly build relationships with EU institutions, abandoning mediation of national governments. But the distance remains even in those cases where business associations knowingly deal with governments, willing to cooperate.

In Great Britain, after the Labor government of T. Blair came to power, the CBP was again included in the dialogue with the government, which was interrupted by the governments of M. Thatcher and J. Major. However, the capabilities of each party decreased noticeably. Depoliticization of economic policy leaves in the hands governments have a limited set of tools. For the government, the value of KBP is representing predominantly crisis industries, also decreased. According to experts, T. Blair's government prefers direct contacts with the management of leading companies. Both for business and for the state associations cease to be an uncontested intermediary. In this sense, it is possible talk about a certain weakening of the mediating role of associations.

Business associations are also distancing themselves from neo-corporatist bilateral and tripartite cooperation bodies. Swedish Employers' Confederation in 1992 withdrew its representatives from all neo-corporate bodies. In France, in 2000, MEDEF withdrew from the executive board of the social security fund and threatened to stop participating in the unemployment fund, and in 2001 did not resumed its representation in several bilateral structures, which administered the French social security system. Leading business associations are actively mastering new political instruments influence. In some cases, leading business associations have actually become renounce “political neutrality” and directly interfere in electoral campaigns. in Sweden: umbrella business associations sa of Sweden against SDRPSH. In France MEDEF publicly announced its position in the presidential elections in 2002. In Japan's Keidanren decision to abandon centralized political financing of political parties in 1993 largely predetermined the defeat ruling LDP in the elections.

Leading business associations are demonstrating a growing ability to attract side of public opinion. They actively work with the public, conduct mass actions. MEDEF was particularly active in this area, increasing communication resources since the early 1970s. Conversion of NSFP to MEDEF marked by an increased emphasis on political activism: The name of the new confederation is “movement”. The MEDEF reform unfolded against the background a series of political campaigns aimed at putting business at the center public attention and mobilize its membership base. The propaganda offensive began in November 1997 with the convening of the "States General" companies. At the end of 1998, a new campaign followed, “Forward, together with enterprises! Forward, together with France!”

In 1999, the promotion of the new MEDEF project began in public opinion under called "Social Reform", the main purpose of which was propaganda reforms of industrial relations. In October 1998, MEDEF was in Paris, a meeting of 30,000 entrepreneurs was held in defense of free entrepreneurship. In Italy in 1998, Confindustria held a series of demonstrations protest of entrepreneurs against the government's economic policy, judging by everything, under the impression of the French experience. In Japan, Keidanren in the 1990s and early 2000s actively collaborated with the public in promoting projects political reform. Since the early 1980s, leading business associations in the EU and Japan actively uses think tanks to promote liberal reforms, specially created for these purposes (first in the UK, then inFrance, currently in Japan).

Where leading associations have been able to successfully respond to new challenges associated with economic and political changes, their central position in the system associations have strengthened. In France, MEDEF was legitimized as an institution, representing the interests of the entire business community. Name of the leading association business has become the collective brand of French entrepreneurs, in fact, replacing the old generic term "patronage". The same can be said about positions “Nippon Keidanren in Japan and the Swedish Enterprise Confederation. In those cases, when the leading associations have not yet been able to find an adequate response to the challenges, they face the prospect of losing their central position in the system of associations. This is actually the situation that KBP found itself in the UK. Membership base associations are still based in declining traditional industries economy, but it is not possible to penetrate properly into new sectors of the economy. The problem of the KBP is the contradiction between the functions of representation (the desire to retain the traditional base) and an application for the role of political leader national business community.

Strengthening the centrality of leading associations combined with expansion autonomy in relations with national governments and political parties contributed to increasing their political status. In some cases, leading associations have turned into full-fledged political actors, i.e. autonomous a political force that participates in the political process along with parties, movements, media. This is how changes in political status are assessed MEDEF in France, the Swedish Enterprise Confederation and Nippon Keidanren. In 1990 - 2000s, leading business associations in these countries have become important (sometimes main) force that pushed governments towards economic and political reforms. (Something similar happened with leading US business associations in the time of political mobilization of business in the second half of the 1970s.)

The formation of EU institutions has also contributed to changes in the behavior of national associations, as well as their role in relations between business and nation states. EU institutions in general are open and cooperative with interest groups. The European Union is of decisive importance for business interests commission having the exclusive right to initiate European legislation. The Council of Ministers also plays an important role in decision-making, but it consists of representatives of governments and international organizations, and the "input" business interests are hampered in it. National business associations are actively master the EU institutions. But adaptation comes in different ways. For example, industry German business associations generally adapt more easily to European institutions than associations of a similar profile in France. In cooperation with EU institutions, industry business associations in Germany and France is more inclined to rely on the mediation of national authorities. 

At the same time, in their contacts with European bodies, industry French associations show increased dependence on mediation national government than associations of a similar type in Germany. This explained by the fact that interest groups from “neo-corporatist” systems, such as German, where experience has already been accumulated in close interaction with government bodies authorities are in a more advantageous position in relations with European bodies position compared to interest groups from “statist” systems, such as French, where traditionally interest groups are allowed to participate in the process formation of public policy only in a limited form.

By now, industry business associations have become firmly rooted in EU institutions. The European Commission relies on the knowledge of technical experts to eleven development of regulations and decisions on economic issues and technical standards. At the same time, national and pan-European business associations are facing increasing difficulties at EU level. One reason is that Pan-European business associations are characterized by their unnecessarily cumbersome nature: they are often federations of federations in which it is difficult to negotiate and make decisions on specific questions. Under these conditions, alternative forms of representation of business interests in EU structures. National associations businesses, both inter-industry and industry-specific, establish independent contacts with EU institutions. One of the important goals of the Confindustria reform in 2002 was strengthening the presence in Brussels in order to consolidate the representation of the Italian business. But national associations are not always able to provide adequate representation at European level. Direct contacts between large companies and the European Commission (“direct lobbying”), not mediated by the participation of pan-European and national business associations. In several large industries pan-European “federations of federations” of business were supplanted or at least supplemented by pan-European associations with direct membership organized by leading firms. Quite typical. An example is the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (European Automotive Manufacturers Association), uniting 13 companies.

The distinctive features of this European business association are its membership companies rather than the relevant industry federations, and the direct participation of the highest management of member firms in the work of the association’s board of directors. Under the influence of the outflow of powers from national centers of power “upward”, to supranational EU bodies, and “down” to the regions as a result of large-scale decentralization is eroding the territorial specialization of associations business. Associations at various levels are beginning to actively operate abroad its official jurisdiction, as is typical for interest groups in “federal” political systems (primarily the USA). Seems decisive depth plays a role in the scale of erosion of territorial specialization administrative decentralization in the respective countries. For example, regional business associations in Italy, where political decentralization was more deeper, more actively independently come into direct contact with EU institutions, than the regional business associations of France, where the decentralization of the 1970-1980s. was more modest.