Part I
Global Tax Governance and Developing
Countries
Chapter 1
Getting the Short End of the Stick: Power
Relations and Their Distributive Outcomes
for Lower-Income Countries in Transfer
Pricing Governance
Cassandra Vet, Danny Cassimon, and Anne Van de Vijver
1.1 Introduction
Within the shadow of the G20-OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
Project, transfer pricing experts pack up their suitcases to go and assist developing
countries in their efforts to implement a complex regime of transfer pricing auditing
(Peters 2015; Tax Inspectors Without Borders 2018). At first glance, these efforts
support the reduction of fiscal losses caused by “aggressive” transfer pricing prac
tices, an important channel of corporate tax avoidance in Sub-Saharan Africa (Fuest
and Riedel 2012). Yet, while these efforts strengthen the audit capacity of develop
ing countries, the rules that guide these capacity development projects reinforce the
distributional imbalance of the international tax regime (Magelhaes 2018). This
chapter sheds light on the power relations at play during the G20-OECD reform of
transfer pricing guidelines to highlight how these relations shape the distributional
outcomes of the international tax regime.
Mosquera Valderrama (2015, 2018) already argued that the reform should not
only offer a way out of the collective action problem developing countries face in the
regulation of transfer pricing but also bring about solutions that are efficient and
implementable within the tax culture and context of these countries. From this view,
the legitimacy of the BEPS project depends on more than the sole representation of